Regarding when America should intervene in foreign conflicts, Obama and Clinton both propose rather general doctrines. I’ll start with Obama.
Obama states that America has been an anchor of global security and an advocate for human freedom for generations. He says that we should be (or have been) reluctant to use force to solve challenges, but that we have a responsibility to act when our interests or values are at stake. He names several principles that represent America’s values: opposition to violence directed at one’s own people, support for universal rights, including freedom of expression and self-selection of leaders, and support for governments responsive to their people. These principles don’t exactly comprise a doctrine, but they give an idea of the types of violations that Obama might think merit intervention.
Obama also states that “wherever people long to be free, they will find a friend in the United States.” This isn’t exactly an endorsement of the Bush doctrine, but it’s not terribly far off. Obama isn’t saying it’s America’s job to spread democracy to the world, but he is expressing support for those striving for democracy within their own countries. That’s a step back, but it’s the same sentiment.
On a conciliatory note, Obama reassures the American people that the country’s domestic well-being is the top priority, but says that we have and will continue to protect people around the globe because it increases our future safety.
In terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, I can infer some, but Obama was carefully general. Necessary conditions would probably be something like this:
• American interests of some form at stake – though this could be anything, including the protection of human life
• Important freedoms being suppressed
• People not powerful enough to defend themselves
Obama obviously doesn’t give a sufficient condition. This would be far too much of a commitment – if x happens, America WILL intervene. Leaders thrive on wiggle room, and especially in this area, giving people a specific threshold to either avoid or purposefully cross would be very unwise.
President Obama would probably describe America’s ideal role as advocate for human freedom and protector of human life. America should intervene in conflicts where it can do a great deal of good in these areas without prohibitive cost, as part of an international effort. The role is justifiable morally and politically, though the American public can be very fickle regarding foreign intervention. From a purely economic standpoint, intervention may be profitable if major financial interests are at stake, but the fundamental causes for intervention (loss of life/suppression of freedoms) hold little economic sway.
Clinton proposes a similarly vague, but more limited doctrine. He says that we intervened in Kosovo to uphold our values (undefined here), protect our interests, and advance the cause of peace. He is also frank about the fact that we intervened to save face for NATO and avoid a guilty conscience. If a massacre took place near NATO borders, it would discredit NATO, and they’d feel responsible. So, there was a certain amount of stick motivation.
Clinton states that he was acting somewhat preemptively, to “deal with problems such as this before they do permanent harm to our national interests.” He also says that we have an obligation to our allies to “stand with [them] when they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom, and stability in Europe.” Further, Clinton points to the importance of European security, stability, and prosperity to our own. A couple world wars seem to indicate that he’s right about this.
Again, not much material to extrapolate necessary or sufficient conditions, but they’d be similar to Obama’s.
• Our values are somehow being offended
• Our interests are somehow at stake
• The abstract concept of peace is in jeopardy
Our role in the world should be an advocate for peace and stability according to Clinton. This is a more selfish role than the one proposed by Obama, limiting our interventions to issues that potentially threaten us directly, rather than leaving the door to intervention open to issues of freedom and suppression of rights, any sort of violence by a government against its people. Clinton’s ideal tends more towards the isolationist side, with concessions that sometimes it’s necessary to intervene in order to avoid a later, greater conflict.
This role is less justifiable morally, but more so politically and economically.
For the United States to involve itself in one or a few of the struggles mentioned in the prompt while not intervening in others does seem a bit hypocritical, but realistically, the US can’t intervene in every conflict, so intervening in some is better than none, if you view intervention as positive overall. The US can’t be everywhere, so delegation is not just permissible, it’s necessary. If we were involved in all of them, we’d eventually become spread too thin, like butter over too much toast, and collapse right back into isolationism as the public grew tired of the strain.
Tuesday, April 12, 2011
Thursday, March 10, 2011
The judiciary
In the current federal judicial nomination process, judges are nominated by the president (more accurately, by an office subordinate to the president, subject to his approval) and then confirmed or rejected by the Senate. This is the system set up in Article II, Section 2:
In principle, I like this system. On its face, it seems to evenly divide influence over the judicial branch between the executive and legislative branches. I also agree with the choice of the Senate, since senators tend to be more experienced and knowledgeable than Congressmen, and the process of judicial nomination is very important to the stability and effective operation of the government. However, there are some large problems.
The confirmation of judicial nominees has unfortunately become yet another of the political tools that the opposition can hold over the president’s head. Rather than doing their constitutional duty and confirming qualified justices in a timely manner, the opposition can filibuster votes or block them outright if they have a majority, until such time as the President gives them something they want. These delays are rarely for relevant reasons of merit, but political maneuvers. These delays are unnecessary and have the potential to harm the efficacy and expediency of the justice system.
In terms of the quality of judges, I think we’re doing fine overall. There are probably more political nominees than there should be, in spite of Nixon’s legacy of a professionalized judiciary, but this doesn’t seem to be a glaring problem.
The Court is a fundamentally political body, but is temIn terms of the quality of judges, I think we’re doing fine overall. There are probably more political nominees than there should be, in spite of Nixon’s legacy of a professionalized judiciary, but this doesn’t seem to be a glaring problem.
The Court is a fundamentally political body. Its political whims are tempered in some cases by the actual facts of the case, but as many surveys of Court decisions go, justices vote largely according to their political beliefs. This explains the frequency of 5-4 split votes. This shows that the idea of judicial objectivity is largely a myth.
That’s not to say that the facts of the case are irrelevant; however, justices tend to be very mindful of how the ruling will affect the rest of the legal world in precedent, and their political views shape how this awareness affects their votes.
As an example to support my claim: if justices were truly objective, merely agents who applied the law to individual, why would we need a multi-layered appellate court system? Every judge would always reach the same conclusion. This is, of course, absurd. Judges are human, and their experiences, beliefs, etc, all color the way they see and interpret facts.
I don’t think the president really needs to address the myth of judicial objectivity unless it becomes necessary to publically oppose a particularly heinous ruling. Without that occurring, there’s just no need for him to talk about it. The president picks justices who share as many of his beliefs as possible while still getting the nomination confirmed. The justices present themselves as objective during the Congressional hearings, and the president extols their qualifications and merit as a great legal mind. It’s all essentially a charade, but what’s wrong with that? Calling it what it is wouldn’t intensify the battle over nominations substantially, since everyone involved knows what’s really going on. For the president to explicitly promote the myth of judicial objectivity would be dishonest, unnecessary, and harmful to the reputation of the Court as well as the political prospects of the president.
However, when the lack of objectivity in the Court leads to decisions the president sees as dangerous, it may be beneficial for him to come out against them publicly. Obama’s criticism of the decision in Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Commission was justified, in my opinion, and necessary both for the political future of himself and his party and on principle. If he had said nothing, the public would’ve seen him as complicit, and associated him and the Democratic Party with the massive corporate spending that more often fills the pockets of the GOP. Note: I have no evidence to back up that claim, but I’m pretty sure it’s true.
“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
In principle, I like this system. On its face, it seems to evenly divide influence over the judicial branch between the executive and legislative branches. I also agree with the choice of the Senate, since senators tend to be more experienced and knowledgeable than Congressmen, and the process of judicial nomination is very important to the stability and effective operation of the government. However, there are some large problems.
The confirmation of judicial nominees has unfortunately become yet another of the political tools that the opposition can hold over the president’s head. Rather than doing their constitutional duty and confirming qualified justices in a timely manner, the opposition can filibuster votes or block them outright if they have a majority, until such time as the President gives them something they want. These delays are rarely for relevant reasons of merit, but political maneuvers. These delays are unnecessary and have the potential to harm the efficacy and expediency of the justice system.
In terms of the quality of judges, I think we’re doing fine overall. There are probably more political nominees than there should be, in spite of Nixon’s legacy of a professionalized judiciary, but this doesn’t seem to be a glaring problem.
The Court is a fundamentally political body, but is temIn terms of the quality of judges, I think we’re doing fine overall. There are probably more political nominees than there should be, in spite of Nixon’s legacy of a professionalized judiciary, but this doesn’t seem to be a glaring problem.
The Court is a fundamentally political body. Its political whims are tempered in some cases by the actual facts of the case, but as many surveys of Court decisions go, justices vote largely according to their political beliefs. This explains the frequency of 5-4 split votes. This shows that the idea of judicial objectivity is largely a myth.
That’s not to say that the facts of the case are irrelevant; however, justices tend to be very mindful of how the ruling will affect the rest of the legal world in precedent, and their political views shape how this awareness affects their votes.
As an example to support my claim: if justices were truly objective, merely agents who applied the law to individual, why would we need a multi-layered appellate court system? Every judge would always reach the same conclusion. This is, of course, absurd. Judges are human, and their experiences, beliefs, etc, all color the way they see and interpret facts.
I don’t think the president really needs to address the myth of judicial objectivity unless it becomes necessary to publically oppose a particularly heinous ruling. Without that occurring, there’s just no need for him to talk about it. The president picks justices who share as many of his beliefs as possible while still getting the nomination confirmed. The justices present themselves as objective during the Congressional hearings, and the president extols their qualifications and merit as a great legal mind. It’s all essentially a charade, but what’s wrong with that? Calling it what it is wouldn’t intensify the battle over nominations substantially, since everyone involved knows what’s really going on. For the president to explicitly promote the myth of judicial objectivity would be dishonest, unnecessary, and harmful to the reputation of the Court as well as the political prospects of the president.
However, when the lack of objectivity in the Court leads to decisions the president sees as dangerous, it may be beneficial for him to come out against them publicly. Obama’s criticism of the decision in Citizen’s United v. Federal Election Commission was justified, in my opinion, and necessary both for the political future of himself and his party and on principle. If he had said nothing, the public would’ve seen him as complicit, and associated him and the Democratic Party with the massive corporate spending that more often fills the pockets of the GOP. Note: I have no evidence to back up that claim, but I’m pretty sure it’s true.
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Politicos: protecting the people from popular ignorance
In my view, the president should ideally act as a politico, representing the entire citizenry of the United States. Politicos are superior to either delegates or trustees, since it allows the president to avoid the pitfalls that face the other two models.
Delegates, who act in a way that represents the beliefs and desires of her constituents, face several weaknesses. There are many issues about which the general public is ill-informed or unaware. This is to be expected, as not everyone in the country has time to stay up to date on the hundreds of different issues regarding which the government must make decisions. On the other hand, a trustee feels no obligation to act in accord with the wishes of their constituents, which can be potentially harmful. Upon being elected, they make decisions based on what they alone think is best for their constituents, which gives the representative too much discretion, too much opportunity for action that opposes the interests of their constituents.
So, a politico representative strikes the best balance between the two. Regarding issues about which the public is well informed and is able to responsibly decide for itself, the politico acts like a delegate, acting in accord with the will of the people. Conversely, regarding issues about which the public is ill-informed and not able to responsibly decide for itself, the politico acts as a trustee, doing what he (or advising experts) think is in the public’s best interest.
The president, though not elected by the entire country or even the entire electorate, should represent every citizen of the United States to the best of his ability. While he has to be careful not to alienate his base, after being elected to the presidency, his obligation is to do what is in the best interest of every citizen of the United States. This isn’t a perfect world, so this won’t happen all the time, but a president who acts in the interests of his base when it adversely affects the rest of the country poses the same danger as majority factions in Congress, as discussed by Madison in Federalist #10.
People shouldn’t really expect their president to be descriptively representative, wherein the representative comes from the same social demographic. For one thing, the president cannot descriptively represent everyone, so it would be absurd for everyone to expect descriptive representation. Further, having a president who descriptively represented some social groups, such as those without college degrees or the homeless, just wouldn’t be a good idea. We want our president to have a college degree. That said, the president does often represent a large portion of the electorate descriptively. Given the trends in elected presidents, the educated upper-middle to upper class is typically represented descriptively. To expect anything different would be fairly unrealistic, and any other form of descriptive representation probably wouldn’t be of much benefit. Other perceived benefits of descriptive representation would likely be purely symbolic, not actually improving the substantive representation.
Delegates, who act in a way that represents the beliefs and desires of her constituents, face several weaknesses. There are many issues about which the general public is ill-informed or unaware. This is to be expected, as not everyone in the country has time to stay up to date on the hundreds of different issues regarding which the government must make decisions. On the other hand, a trustee feels no obligation to act in accord with the wishes of their constituents, which can be potentially harmful. Upon being elected, they make decisions based on what they alone think is best for their constituents, which gives the representative too much discretion, too much opportunity for action that opposes the interests of their constituents.
So, a politico representative strikes the best balance between the two. Regarding issues about which the public is well informed and is able to responsibly decide for itself, the politico acts like a delegate, acting in accord with the will of the people. Conversely, regarding issues about which the public is ill-informed and not able to responsibly decide for itself, the politico acts as a trustee, doing what he (or advising experts) think is in the public’s best interest.
The president, though not elected by the entire country or even the entire electorate, should represent every citizen of the United States to the best of his ability. While he has to be careful not to alienate his base, after being elected to the presidency, his obligation is to do what is in the best interest of every citizen of the United States. This isn’t a perfect world, so this won’t happen all the time, but a president who acts in the interests of his base when it adversely affects the rest of the country poses the same danger as majority factions in Congress, as discussed by Madison in Federalist #10.
People shouldn’t really expect their president to be descriptively representative, wherein the representative comes from the same social demographic. For one thing, the president cannot descriptively represent everyone, so it would be absurd for everyone to expect descriptive representation. Further, having a president who descriptively represented some social groups, such as those without college degrees or the homeless, just wouldn’t be a good idea. We want our president to have a college degree. That said, the president does often represent a large portion of the electorate descriptively. Given the trends in elected presidents, the educated upper-middle to upper class is typically represented descriptively. To expect anything different would be fairly unrealistic, and any other form of descriptive representation probably wouldn’t be of much benefit. Other perceived benefits of descriptive representation would likely be purely symbolic, not actually improving the substantive representation.
Sunday, February 6, 2011
Presidential Power
Presidents Taft and Roosevelt espoused very different theories of presidential power. Roosevelt took a very loose constructionist view of the role of the executive. He believed that the president was given the power to do anything that wasn't expressly forbidden, and even took it a step further. In certain times of crisis, Roosevelt argued, the president would be forced, in acting in the best interest of the country he swore to defend, to take actions that were expressly against the constitution. His view of the occasional necessity of extra-constitutional presidential activity is evidenced by his unprecedented actions to combat the Depression.
Taft's view was entirely the opposite. He believed that the president was allowed only the powers he was specifically granted by the constitution, a strict constructionist view. In metaphor, he thought that the presidency should be a man tightly bound by the constitution, only able to move in the small, specific ways the bindings allowed. Even in times of crisis, if the constitution didn't specifically say the executive could do it, he would be unable to take action.
Roosevelt viewed Taft's theory as preventing the executive from truly doing his best to protect and defend the constitution, especially in situations when its defense would require briefly ignoring it. Taft, in turn, thought that Roosevelt's theory would allow the president to take dangerous amounts of power, possibly enough to permanently disrupt the stability of our democracy.
My opinion, after putting myself in the president's shoes, is very close to Roosevelt's. If the nation I was charged to defend was in trouble, and I could help in an extra-constitutional way, I would. Someone has to take action, and if the circumstances were such that I was the best person to do so, failing to do so would be a great failure of duty.
The risk for abuse exists, of course, but that risk exists whether or not you ascribe to the belief in potential benevolent uses. My espoused theory of presidential power fares best in situations where unusual circumstances would be best served by temporary, tailored increases in presidential power initiated by the executive. If Congress became compromised somehow and was unable to exercise the powers enumerated to them in the constitution, the president is able to step in and exercise the power, thus saving the nation from a dangerous period of neglect.
This theory of presidential power would fare most poorly if a president asserted and exercised increased power inappropriately, in ways that were not in the nation's best interest. The consequences for such an abuse could be disastrous, as it could severely shake people's faith in the stability of the government, which would have very negative effects on the economy and effectiveness of the government.
The palatability of this theory is very much dependent on the personal characteristics of the person in office. If it's someone the nation trusts to have the best interests of the country at heart and to act faithfully on its behalf, I think many would be at ease with this idea. If, however, the nations didn't have faith in the integrity and dedication of the executive, this idea would likely be frightening and unpopular.
The problem, of course, is that you can't practically have rules that change based on how the president is viewed by the nation. Short of an amendment to the constitution modifying the description of the powers of the executive, how much power a president is allowed to get will essentially be as much as he is able. His power relies upon his personal attributes and the political setting, and can be increased at his discretion if he has enough of these qualities. The limit on presidential power is much more practical than constitutional.
As we can see, the biggest factor in determining presidential power is in fact the president's own view of the presidency, combined with his political and personal savvy. I believe that popularly elected president who consciously overstepped his power on behalf of the nation would be more likely to have a positive than a negative impact. I also believe that there's no practical way to prevent a power hungry president from doing this very same thing, whether we subscribe to Taft's theory or Roosevelt's.
Taft's view was entirely the opposite. He believed that the president was allowed only the powers he was specifically granted by the constitution, a strict constructionist view. In metaphor, he thought that the presidency should be a man tightly bound by the constitution, only able to move in the small, specific ways the bindings allowed. Even in times of crisis, if the constitution didn't specifically say the executive could do it, he would be unable to take action.
Roosevelt viewed Taft's theory as preventing the executive from truly doing his best to protect and defend the constitution, especially in situations when its defense would require briefly ignoring it. Taft, in turn, thought that Roosevelt's theory would allow the president to take dangerous amounts of power, possibly enough to permanently disrupt the stability of our democracy.
My opinion, after putting myself in the president's shoes, is very close to Roosevelt's. If the nation I was charged to defend was in trouble, and I could help in an extra-constitutional way, I would. Someone has to take action, and if the circumstances were such that I was the best person to do so, failing to do so would be a great failure of duty.
The risk for abuse exists, of course, but that risk exists whether or not you ascribe to the belief in potential benevolent uses. My espoused theory of presidential power fares best in situations where unusual circumstances would be best served by temporary, tailored increases in presidential power initiated by the executive. If Congress became compromised somehow and was unable to exercise the powers enumerated to them in the constitution, the president is able to step in and exercise the power, thus saving the nation from a dangerous period of neglect.
This theory of presidential power would fare most poorly if a president asserted and exercised increased power inappropriately, in ways that were not in the nation's best interest. The consequences for such an abuse could be disastrous, as it could severely shake people's faith in the stability of the government, which would have very negative effects on the economy and effectiveness of the government.
The palatability of this theory is very much dependent on the personal characteristics of the person in office. If it's someone the nation trusts to have the best interests of the country at heart and to act faithfully on its behalf, I think many would be at ease with this idea. If, however, the nations didn't have faith in the integrity and dedication of the executive, this idea would likely be frightening and unpopular.
The problem, of course, is that you can't practically have rules that change based on how the president is viewed by the nation. Short of an amendment to the constitution modifying the description of the powers of the executive, how much power a president is allowed to get will essentially be as much as he is able. His power relies upon his personal attributes and the political setting, and can be increased at his discretion if he has enough of these qualities. The limit on presidential power is much more practical than constitutional.
As we can see, the biggest factor in determining presidential power is in fact the president's own view of the presidency, combined with his political and personal savvy. I believe that popularly elected president who consciously overstepped his power on behalf of the nation would be more likely to have a positive than a negative impact. I also believe that there's no practical way to prevent a power hungry president from doing this very same thing, whether we subscribe to Taft's theory or Roosevelt's.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
The State of the Union
President Obama gave his constitutionally mandated Congressional talking-to last night. According to Richard Neustadt, a political scientist noted for his study of the American presidency, Obama was exercising his power of persuasion. Neustadt believes that the president's ability to persuade Congress, other political operators, and the American public is the president's most important and useful power. True, the president is required to meet with Congress "from time to time", but last night's speech wasn't really to Congress. Granted, they were sitting in the room, looking mildly interested (except you, Boehner), but Obama was speaking to the American public. From the bully pulpit, the president can attempt to persuade the public to pressure their representatives to support his initiatives. Depending on the political setting, this can be more effective than trying to persuade the legislators themselves.
I think Obama did a fair job of exercising his power of persuasion last night. It wasn't Obama's greatest speech, but it was good, and he said quite a few things that needed to be said. Given the lost Democratic majority in Congress, Obama needed to make an opening for some teamwork, which was nonexistent in the last Congress. By stating his willingness to compromise and interest in pursuing issues of concern to Republicans, he put the ball in their court. This step, however ineffective it may turn out to be, was very important. Obama is going to have to run for election, and since thus far he hasn't been able to change the political tone of Washington, he's going to need to be able to point to the Republicans and say "Hey, I tried. Those guys are just assholes." In fact, Obama has demonstrated his willingness to compromise many times in the last few years, much to the chagrin of some on the left, but Republicans have been much more effective playing the PR game, stirring up incoherent, irrational anti-government sentiment in Fox News viewers across the country.
I'll go through his main objectives, and discuss how he might be able to achieve them through formal or informal means.
Energy and Climate Change
While carefully not mentioning cap-and-trade, Obama asked Congress to pass a climate and energy bill addressing offshore drilling and beginning the construction of new nuclear power plants. These objectives are essentially relegated to Obama's informal powers, since he obviously cannot make the legislation himself. Although some of his energy/climate goals may be able to be addressed by various government agencies, his most important power will be his power to persuade to garner support for the legislation. Obama also stated his intent to invest in research in areas that would create jobs for America and protect the environment, as well as introducing two goals: become the first country with 1 million electric cars by 2015, and get 80% of our energy from clean sources by 2035. These proposals are huge, and are largely an encouragement to the various industries involved, but they could also be helped along by regulatory agencies (formal power) and tax credits/laws (informal - persuasion).
Tax Cuts
Obama touted the tax relief given to 95% of working families, including the recent reduction in the payroll tax. He proposed a tax on big banks and allowing tax cuts for oil companies and those making more than $250,000 a year to expire. As with his proposed energy bill, Obama relies upon his informal powers to make this happen, since Congress controls the purse.
The Deficit
In addressing the growing budget deficit, Obama announced an upcoming proposal to reorganize the federal government in an effort to save money and increase efficiency. He also called for Congress to simplify the tax code, removing loopholes in the complex rules that allow many corporations to avoid paying sizable amounts of taxes. Instead of raising taxes, he argued, we should actually make corporations pay the ones that are already in place. Obama called for a 5 year freeze on discretionary, non-defense spending. He also pledged to veto any bill that came to his desk with pork attached. This pledge was pretty great. It's all fine and good for politicians on both sides of the aisle to rail against pork, but this is the first real stand anyone's taken against it. His veto pledge can be enforced through the former power of the veto, but the others rely on informal powers.
Healthcare
The president joked that he had heard rumors that some people weren't happy with the health care law. That said, he told Congress that repealing the bill wasn't the right way to address problems with it. He stated that he was willing to work with critics of the bill to improve it, playing the "be a bigger man" card again by making the House's repeal vote look like a petty temper tantrum. The legislation is safe, thanks to the President's veto power. Even if the Senate were to vote to repeal the bill, which they won't, a supermajority in both houses (needed to override the veto) is extraordinarily unlikely.
Education
Obama outlined his vision for bringing the American education system up to speed with the rest of the world. His goals are to train 100,000 new math and science teachers over the next 10 years and attain the highest proportion of college graduates in the world. He has some formal power over these goals through the department of education, but Obama was directly asking people in the United States to become teachers. "Your country needs you," he said - a direct use of his power to persuade. He also asked Congress to make the tuition tax credit permanent, again, informal.
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
an assignment that demands arrogance
So, the balance of power is one of my top priorities. Luckily, I think the balance of power is very close to ideal. The president is not a figurehead, nor is he a despot. When the president is up to the task, he is capable of leading the nation, but his power is neatly checked to prevent him from controlling the country. This is the most remarkable aspect of the Constitution, to me. The system of checks and balances—which seems almost chanced-upon, after hearing about the intense negotiation that created it—is not only elegant in principle, but effective in action.
The one balance tweak I can think of concerns the presidential pardon. Although the controversial abuses in the past haven't been particularly damaging to the nation as far as I know (the same can't be said for Ford's reelection campaign), I think making the pardon subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court makes sense. Granted, this wouldn't be judicial review in the traditional sense, since the pardons wouldn't be checked for constitutionality. The check would be in place simply to prevent the use of the pardon to commit political crimes harmful to the country.
On it's face, the presidential pardon is a power without a check, and could allow, as the anti-Federalists feared, the president to commit crimes of any sort via proxy, then pardon the offender. While such gross misconduct would hopefully result in an impeachment/removal, those pardons would stand, if I understand correctly. The unilateral power to forgive is nice on paper, but the potential abuses unsettle me.
Next is the electoral college. I'm done with it. I'd dissolve it in a heartbeat. Arguments for it are unconvincing to me. It seems to be extremely black and white. If the majority of Americans vote for one candidate, no arbitrary, unnecessary bureaucratic structure should stand in the way. Cable news networks could still have their pretty red and blue maps and talk about who's going to win Florida, but the 49.99% of the state who voted for the other guy wouldn't have to be so completely disenfranchised. In addition, as Michele Boulais articulates here,
"The electoral college gives unfair weight to smaller states. Under this system, not all votes are created equal. Yes, the number of electoral votes states receive are divided sorta kinda on population numbers, but look at this comparison*:Wyoming: population- 544,270 electoral votes- 3California: population- 36,961,664 electoral votes- 55One Wyoming vote: 5.512 e^-6 One California vote: 1.488 e^-6"
Elections are already complicated enough without indirect presidential elections in which "one man one vote" isn't just politically incorrect.
Finally, signing statements are absurd. Separation of powers exists for a reason. The president shouldn't be able to sign a bill, then add an asterisk that potentially changes the effect of the entire law. Essentially, through signing statements, the president can legislate, and the actual legislature can't do anything about it. George W. Bush issued over 1000 signing statements during his presidency. That's roughly 1000 too many. The legislature can't do the president's job, so he shouldn't be able to do theirs.
Since this power obviously isn't among the enumerated powers in the Constitution, I would add the following clause to Article I, Section 7, after the second line of the second paragraph:
"The President may not redact, amend, or otherwise alter the content of any Bill."
That's all I've got, and not for lack of trying. The system of checks and balances satisfies me. I've tried to think of other powers the president should have, and I really can't. He has all the powers he requires to fulfill his role in the government, and none that would allow him to encroach on the role of others.
Corin Chellberg
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